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3. Denial of effective assistance of counsel in a criminal case is
not subject to the state action limitation because of the express
language of the sixth amendment that "the accused shall enjoy
... the assistance of counsel." Even if there were such a require-
ment, it is met by the monopolistic control by the state over
lawyers' qualifications and discipline, the state's duty to provide a
fundamentally fair trial, and the fact that lawyers, whether re-
tained or appointed, hold a cpnstitutional office that effectuates
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HERMAN RADDATZ
(Docket No. 79-8)
Criminal procedure - Federal Magistrate Act - Motions to
suppress
On a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Decision below: 592 F.2d 976 (1979)
Analysis prepared February 13, 1980, by LeRoy Pernell, Assistant
Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law, 1659
North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210; telephone (614)
422-6821
Issue
Whether a district court may, consistent with due process and
The Federal Magistrate Act ("Act"), rule on a motion to suppress
alleged involuntary statements based on a record developed be-
fore a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 636(b)(1)(B) and
(C) of the Act without holding a new evidentiary hearing to re-
solve questions of witness credibility.
Facts
On August 8, 1976, Herman Raddatz, a convicted felon, and
Jimmy Batson, both Chicago residents, were involved in a fight in
which Batson was injured. Chicago police called to the scene dis-
covered that Raddatz was armed with a pistol. A state charge of
possession of a firearm was filed against Raddatz in October. The
weapon recQvered was subsequently determined to be the same
weapon involved in a West Virginia homicide.
On November 19, 1976, two federal agents, Russell and Mc-
Culloch, representing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms, visited Raddatz at his home, gave him his Miranda warn-
ings, and questioned him as to how he had obtained the weapon.
Raddatz later testified that the two agents at this November
meeting promised him that if he cooperated with the federal au-
thorities, a pending federal indictment would be dropped, an as-
sertion denied by both agents. Russell, however, acknowledged
that Raddatz was told if he helped them, the United States Attor-
ney would be told of his cooperation in any subsequent prosecu-
tion. Raddatz subsequently made statements to the agents as to
how he came into possession of the pistol.
Two months later, Raddatz met with the federal agents again,
retracted his previous story, and gave an incriminating statement
indicating that he had obtained the weapon from a relative and
was familiar with its history. Later, Raddatz testified that he gave
this incriminating statement in reliance on promises of immunity
made to him by the agents. The agents again denied having made
these promises. Raddatz subsequently agreed to be an informant
concerning other criminal activities, but, apparently after failing
to provide useful information, was indicted in March 1977 for the
the sixth amendment guarantee.
4. The appellate court merely applied the correct federal law to
undisputed facts and drew a different conclusion; it did not en-
gage in de novo fact-finding.
5. The court should adopt a prophylactic rule against joint rep-
resentation to fully preserve the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. A waiver requirement is not likely to be ef-
fective, and appellate review of a conflict of interest dispute may
be ineffectual.
federal offense of the receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The Government sought to introduce Raddatz's prior state-
ments as proof of when he received the firearm. A motion to sup-
press the statement as involuntary was filed by the defendant, and
the court, pursuant to the Federal Magistrate Act, referred the
evidentiary determination to the magistrate over the defense ob-
jection. The magistrate, after conducting a hearing, concluded
that the defendant's testimony lacked credibility and recom-
mended to the trial judge that the motion be overruled.
Background and Significance
According to 28 U.S.C. sections 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), a federal
district court judge may designate a United States magistrate,
who is not a federal judge appointed and approved by Congress
pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, to conduct evidentiary
hearings pertaining to motions to suppress. The magistrate must
prepare and file proposed findings of fact and recommendations,
which the judge may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part,
without hearing the testimony firsthand. With respect to any por-
tion of the report properly objected to by a party, the judge must
make a de novo determination.
This case raises the question of what "de novo" means in this
statute. Traditionally, "de novo" has meant "to hear anew";
therefore, most de novo proceedings are completely new hearings
where the judge starts from the beginning and hears the evidence
firsthand. But in the Federal Magistrate Act, the provision calls
for the judge to make a de novo "determination," as opposed to
requiring a "hearing" or "proceeding." The Government main-
tains that this means that all the judge need do is review the report
and transcript of testimony and make his own assessment as to
the facts of the matter. The defendant argues, on the other hand,
that it is not possible to resolve disputed testimony accurately
without seeing and hearing the witness's behavior, because the
manner in which a witness answers questions often indicates
whether he is telling the truth.
The defendant in the case at hand objected to the findings of
the magistrate that Raddatz was not truthful in his claim that he
was induced to make incriminating statements by promises that
federal charges would be dropped. The judge rejected the defend-
ant's assertion that a new hearing must be held in order for him to
determine who was telling the truth, and reviewing only the
magistrate's report and the transcript of proceedings, adopted the
magistrate's recommendations. Appeal on this question was
taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which reversed the lower court, finding that de novo means
that the trial judge is required by statute to hold a new hearing,
and that when the defendant's testimony is not incredible, the
truth cannot be derived wholly from a written record. The appeals
court, however, rejected the defendant's assertion that the Federal
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Magistrate Act violates the Constitution by allowing initial fac-
tual determinations to be made by magistrates who are not federal
judges appointed pursuant to Article III.
The issues presented by this case are of great significance to the
administration of the federal district courts. The system of refer-
ral to magistrates of initial fact-determination hearings was de-
signed to aid the courts in handling ever-increasing caseloads. If
the court of appeals decision is affirmed, the Government fears
that judges will feel obligated, in all cases, to either hold a second
full hearing or to simply decline in all cases to refer preliminary
fact determinations to magistrates. Such a result would greatly
delay the speedy disposition of cases.
The issue is also important because it may affect the fairness
and outcome of the criminal trial. The determination of a motion
to suppress evidence is often, as a practical matter, dispositive of
the criminal charge, particularly when the prosecution lacks addi-
tional evidence to support the elements of the charge. Therefore,
a system that allows the court to decide these motions merely on
the basis of a written record may invite an intolerably high margin
of error, offensive to due process of law. At issue also is the
power of Congress to delegate judicial responsibilities to others
than federal judges. This case may have a significant effect on fu-
ture legislative attempts at judicial reform.
Arguments
For Petitioner, United States of America:
I. Legislative history indicates that the phrase "de novo deter-
mination" as used in 28 U.S.C. sections 636(b)(l)(B) and (C) does
not mean that a judge must hold a second evidentiary hearing.
2. Article III of the Constitution does not prohibit reference of
suppression motions to magistrates for evidentiary hearings when
a federal judge appointed pursuant to Article III makes a subse-
quent de novo determination.
3. The referral of the suppression motion to a magistrate for an
evidentiary hearing does not deprive a defendant of due process
of law because the defendant's due process interest in the out-
come of a suppression hearing is not the same as, or as strong as,
his interest in the criminal trial itself, the de novo review process
envisioned by the Federal Magistrate Act adequately protects
against the admission of illegally-seized evidence at trial, and
economic and administrative considerations justify the use of
magistrates.
For Respondent, Herman Raddatz:
1. The intent of Congress in requiring a de novo determination
was that the defendant has a right to an independent hearing at
which live testimony is taken that is not prejudiced by the magis-
trate's suggested findings.
2. In deciding the defendant's motion to suppress, the district
judge could not make an independent assessment of credibility in
a manner consistent with due process without hearing and seeing
the witness testify.
3. Raddatz was constitutionally entitled to a meaningful deter-
mination of his motion to suppress by an Article III judge. Con-
gress has no authority to delegate, or allow for the delegation of,
that responsibility to a non-Article III judicial officer. Only if an
Article III judge actually hears the testimony will the defendant's
constitutional rights be protected.
NAVARRO SAVINGS ASSOCIATION
v. LAWRENCE F. LEE, JR., et al.
(Docket No. 79-465)
Diversity jurisdiction - Citizenship of a business trust
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Decision below: 597 F. 2d 421 (1979)
Analysis prepared February 15, 1980, by Jeffrey A. Parness, As-
sistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law,
Akron, OH 44325; telephone (216) 375-7331
Issue
For diversity purposes, what is the manner of determining the
citizenship of a profit-oriented, unincorporated business trust op-
erated by trustees who are elected by the trust's beneficial share-
holders?
Facts
Eight individuals, all non-Texas citizens and trustees of Fidelit)
Mortgage Investors ("FMI"), a Massachusetts business trust,
commenced an action as representatives of FMI in a federal dis-
trict court against the Navarro Savings Association ("Navarro"),
a corporate citizen of Texas. FMI was a profit-oriented business
trust whose principal purpose was the investment of trust assets in
obligations secured by mortgages on real property or other rights
or interests in real property. According to the Declaration of
Trust that created FMI, the trustees were given the general power
to perform whatever acts were necessary, in their sole judgment
and discretion, for carrying out the purposes of the trust or con-
ducting its business. Specifically, the trustees were given the
power to collect, sue for, and receive all sums of money coming
due to the trust, and to prosecute, join, defend, compromise,
abandon, or adjust any actions, suits, claims, demands, or other
litigation relating to the trust, the trust estate, or the trust's af-
fairs. Pursuant to the Trust Declaration, the approximately 9,500
shareholders were deemed the equitable beneficiaries of the trust,
had the authority to elect and remove trustees, possessed the right
to approve any sale or disposition of assets comprising more than
half of the trust estate, and could freely transfer their shares as
personal property.
In the instant case, the trustees sought damages for Navarro's
alleged fraud and breach of a contract to make a loan. Finding
the citizenship of the FMI shareholders rather than of its trustees
the determinative factor, the trial court dismissed the action for
want of jurisdiction under the general diversity statute. The court
of appeals reversed, finding the citizenship of the FMI trustees de-
terminative due to the trustees' power to sue and be sued on
behalf of the trust, as well as to their actual control of the trust.
Background and Significance
The debate regarding the citizenship of corporations for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction seemingly ceased long ago when the
Supreme Court established a presumption that all stockholders of
a corporation are citizens of the state of its incorporation. This
presumption, though today only a fiction, is recognized as having
dramatically impacted upon federal diversity jurisdiction by ex-
Continued on page 8
